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RECENT DEVELOPMENT IN NEW
YORK LAW
-City of New York v. State of New York. The New York State
Court of Appeals, in declaring the repeal of the commuter tax
unconstitutional, strikes another blow against constitutional
home rule in New York.
ELIOT J. KIRSHNITZ*
INTRODUCTION
On May 27, 1999, Governor George Pataki signed into law
Chapter Five of the 1999 Laws of New York,1 amending the tax
law2 and the general city law,3 effectively abolishing the thirty-
three year old income tax on commuters who work in New York
City but live elsewhere 4 in New York State.5 The potential
* J.D. Candidate, June 2001, St. John's University School of Law; B.A., New
York University.
1 Act of May 27, 1999, Ch. 5, [1999] N.Y. Laws 102 (McKinney) (codified as
amended at N.Y. TAX LAW § 1305(b) (McKinney 2000)).
2 See Ch. 5, § 1, [1999] N.Y. Laws 102 (McKinney).
3 See Ch. 5, § 2, [1999] N.Y. Laws 102 (McKinney).
4 The commuter tax was originally enacted in July 1966. See Memorandum of
Legislative Representative of City of New York, reprinted in Ch. 774, [1966] N.Y.
Laws 2923 (McKinney) (codified as amended at N.Y. GEN. CITY LAW § 25-m
(McKinney 1999)). The bill was the subject of contentious debate. See Esther Fuchs,
Two Views of the Commuter's Curse; The City Already Pays More Than Its Fair
Share, N.Y. TIMES, May 22, 1999, at A13 (quoting Jules Sabbatino, a Queens
Democrat, as shouting to upstate Republicans, "[let us secede from the state, and
you'll come begging to get us back"). The act was designed to "place[0 a share of the
burden of operating a large metropolitan hub equitably upon those who use its
facilities and services but who do not live within the City." Memorandum of
Legislative Representative of City of New York, reprinted in [1966] N.Y. Laws 2923
(McKinney). While the bill applied to any city with a population in excess of one
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revenue loss to the City was extensive.6 While the repeal was
slated to take effect on July 1, 1999,7 within a week of its
million, it specifically "enable[d] the City of New York to adopt local legislation...
to tax nonresidents of the City who earn their livelihood in the City but who live
beyond its boundaries." Id. Accordingly, New York City enacted a tax on nonresident
commuters by local law. See NEW YORK, N.Y., ADMIN. CODE ch. 19, § 11-1901 (1997).
The original 1966 tax rate was 0.25% on all wages. See Ch. 774, § (a)(1), [1966] N.Y.
Laws 2923 (McKinney). In 1971, however, the rate was increased for two years to
0.45%. See Act of June 9, 1971, Ch. 408, § 6, [1971] N.Y. Laws 578, 580-81
(McKinney). The law was periodically renewed so that the effective tax rate never
lapsed back to the 1966 rate of 0.25%. The 1971 increase was scheduled to lapse on
December 31, 1999. See Act of Aug. 26, 1997, Ch. 497, § 2(a)(2)(i), [1997] N.Y. Laws
1455, 1456 (McKinney).
5 The repeal accomplished this by amending two statutes. First, it amended the
definition of"[c]ity nonresident individual" in section 1305(b) of the tax law to mean
"an individual who is not a resident of such city or the state of New York." Ch. 5, § 1,
[1999] N.Y. Laws 102 (McKinney); N.Y. TAX LAW § 1305(b) (Consol. Supp. 2000)
(emphasis added). Second, it amended the definition of "nonresident individual" in
section 25-rn of the General City Law to mean "an individual who is not a resident of
the city or the state of New York." § 2, 1999 N.Y. Laws at 102; N.Y. GEN. CITY LAW §
25-rn (Consol. Cur. Supp. Feb. 2000) (emphasis added). The legislation further
provided that in the event that either amendment was adjudged to be invalid or
unconstitutional on its face or in its application, the entire commuter tax would be
repealed. See Ch. 5, §§ 3, 4, 9(2), [1999] N.Y. Laws at 102-03.
The repeal of the commuter tax was first raised in late April 1999 by State
Senator and Nassau County Republican Dean G. Skelos, who questioned the
fairness of retaining the commuter tax while the Giuliani administration was
announcing tax cuts for residents of New York City. See Clifford J. Levy & Abby
Goodnough, End to Commuter Tax Nears With Jolting Speed in Albany, N.Y. TIMES,
May 14, 1999, at Al. The issue was soon taken up by Rockland County Democrat
Kenneth Zebrowski in his race for the state senate against Republican Thomas
Morahan, who also seized on the issue. See id. At that time, however, Zebrowski did
not believe the repeal to be truly viable, due to opposition from Assembly Speaker
and Manhattan Democrat Sheldon Silver. See id. Unexpectedly, Silver supported
the repeal, leading Mayor Giuliani to assert that the bill was calculated to hurt his
appeal with upstate voters in his possible United States Senate bid. See id. Giuliani
vowed to fight the repeal in the courts if necessary. See Richard P4rez-Pefia, Experts
Say Repeal of Commuter Tax Seems Valid, N.Y. TIMES, May 14, 1999, at B10. The
debate in Albany was contentious and marked by cynicism. See Clifford J. Levy,
Legislature Acts Quickly to Repeal Commuter Tax, N.Y. TIMES, May 18, 1999, at Al.
Democrats and Republicans alike from New York City opposed the bill. See id.
Queens Democrat Anthony Seminerio charged, "[tihey can't get a budget
together... but when it came to this piece of garbage, they are ... scheming all over
the place... Of course this is for the election coming up." Id. The bill passed on May
17, 1999 by a vote of 92 to 49. See id.; see also Abby Goodnough, State Senate
Republicans Seek to Drop Commuter Tax, N.Y. TIMES, May 12, 1999, at B6
(addressing the political motivations behind repealing the commuter tax).
6 The Independent Budget Office estimated a potential loss to the City of $360.6
million in fiscal year 2000 alone. See Current Development: Audits and Reports:
Independent Budget Office Commuter Tax, 5 CITY LAW 58 (May/June 1999). The
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passage, several out-of-state parties mounted court challenges
against New York State in New York Supreme Court.8 The City
of New York (the "City") also challenged the repeal, but by
necessity had to mount its challenge from a different legal basis.
The four out-of-state plaintiffs charged that imposing the
commuter tax only on non-New York State residents violated the
Privileges and Immunities, Equal Protection, and Commerce
Clauses of the United States Constitution.9 If the out-of-state
plaintiffs were successful and the repeal was found
unconstitutional, then by the very terms of the repeal, the entire
commuter tax would be repealed and of no force and effect. 10
The City, of course, could not afford that outcome-it desperately
needed the commuter tax in place. 1 The City, therefore,
challenged the repeal on the basis that the state could not repeal
the tax without a "home rule" message from the City.12 As
City stands to lose over $1.5 billion through 2003. See id. The New York City
Council announced that it would have to forego its own planned tax cuts of $443
million for New York City residents. See Abby Goodnough, City Council to Curtail
Planned Tax Cuts, N.Y. TIMES, May 23, 1999, at A31; Abby Goodnough, Budget
Surplus Puzzle: Spend Today What Could Vanish Tomorrow?, N.Y. TIMES, May 24,
1999, at B1 (noting the Giuliani administration's statement that City surplus funds
would not be sufficient to make up for the $360 million dollar loss created by the
repeal of the commuter tax).
7 See Act of May 27,1999, Ch. 5, § 9(1), [1999] N.Y. Laws 102, 103 (McKinney)
(codified as amended at N.Y. TAX LAW § 1305 (McKinney 2000)).
8 Citizens and Attorneys General from Connecticut, New Jersey, and
Pennsylvania filed suit. See New Jersey Files Commuter Tax Suit, N.Y. L.J., June 2,
1999, at 2. (arguing that the "limited repeal is a violation of interstate commerce
and travel and of equal protection and due process"); see also Wolf v. State, No. 99
Civ. 111272 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1999).
9 See Glenn Newman, The Commuter: Residents v. Non-Residents, N.Y. L.J.,
June 16, 1999, at 3, 7. The plaintiffs also claimed that the repeal violated their civil
rights pursuant to 42 U.S.C § 1983 (1994). See id. at 7.
10 See Newman, supra note 9, at 3 (stating that the entire New York City
Nonresident Earnings Tax would be repealed if not applied to residents of New York
State).
11 See Goodnough, supra note 6, at A31 (noting that New York City needed the
commuter tax in order to provide for the proposed $443 million in tax cuts for city
residents). State lawmakers noted suburban residents who work in New York City
deserved a piece of this windfall. See id.
12 See P6rez-Pefia, supra note 5, at B10 (quoting Mayor Giuliani as saying that
"[t]here is no question that you need a home rule message in order to do this"). The
Mayor's conviction in this position was, no doubt, buoyed by the fact that just three
years earlier the City had successfully fought state legislation relating to the Public
Employment Relations Board for failure to comply with the home rule requirements
of the New York State constitution. See City of New York v. Patrolmen's Benevolent
Ass'n, 676 N.E.2d 847, 849 (N.Y. 1996) (affirming the lower court's decision that the
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explored in greater detail later in this Recent Development, the
New York State constitution limits the State's power over its
cities. This system of local governance, which in limited
circumstances, prevents the state legislature from directly
affecting a city without that city's consent, is known as "home
rule."13 The City postulated that if its challenge was successful,
the entire repeal would be invalidated, the constitutional
challenges would be moot, and the commuter tax would be
restored for all non-New York City commuters. 14
I. IGOE V. PATAiA: THE NEW YORK SUPREME COURT DECISION
The five cases challenging the tax law amendment were
consolidated and argued before Justice Barry A. Cozier in the
Supreme Court of New York for New York County.15 In a "well
reasoned decision,"16 Justice Cozier declared that the commuter
tax, as amended by the 1999 repeal for residents of New York
State, was "in violation of the Privileges and Immunities Clause,
Commerce Clause, and the Equal Protection Clause of the U.S.
Constitution, as well as the Equal Protection Clause of the New
York State constitution."17 As to New York City's coffers, Justice
Cozier declared the repeal valid and not in violation of the home
enactment of Chapter 13 of the Laws of 1996, which "relate[d] to the 'property,
affairs or government' of New York City," was unconstitutional because it was
enacted without a home rule message from New York City); see also infra notes 84-
92 and accompanying text. The Mayor proclaimed, "[wie litigated this issue with the
state just a few years ago... and we won." Pdrez-Pefia, supra note 5, at B10.
13 See infra Part III.
14 See Current Development: Audits and Reports: Independent Budget Office
Commuter Tax, supra note 6, at 58. This position was only partially true. The 1971
increase was set to lapse on December 31, 1999, cutting the tax rate nearly in half,
from 0.45% to 0.25%. See N.Y. TAX LAW § 1305 2-A(a)(i) (Consol. Supp. 2000). Even
Mayor Giuliani conceded that the state could let the 1971 increase lapse without a
home rule message. See P4rez-Pefia, supra note 5, at B10. Under the Independent
Budget Office analysis, if the repeal remained in effect, eliminating the tax for New
York State residents only, the loss to the City would have been $208.6 million in
fiscal year 2000. See Current Development: Audits and Reports: Independent Budget
Office Commuter Tax, supra note 6, at 58. Even if the City's challenge was
successful and Albany let the 1971 increase lapse, the City would still have lost
approximately $150 million in 2000.
15 See Igoe v. Pataki, 696 N.Y.S.2d 355 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County), affd sub nom.
City of New York v. State, 696 N.Y.S.2d 426 (1st Dep't 1999) [hereinafter City of
New York 11, aff/d, 730 N.E.2d 920 (N.Y. 2000) [hereinafter City of New York Il].
16 City of New York II, 730 N.E.2d at 924.
17 Igoe, 696 N.Y.S.2d at 365.
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rule provision of the New York State constitution.' 8 While
Justice Cozier declined to enjoin its collection,19 the entire
commuter tax was repealed and of no force or effect.20 While the
City vowed to appeal,2 1 the New York State Tax Department
advised employers to continue to deduct the tax from the salaries
of out-of-state residents. 22  Justice Cozier's decision was
unanimously affirmed by the Appellate Division for the First
Department23 and the New York Court of Appeals.
24
II. THE NEW YORK COURT OF APPEALS REVIEWS THE REPEAL OF
THE COMMUTER TAX
In an opinion by Judge Wesley, the Court of Appeals
reasoned that while the Privileges and Immunities Clause of the
United States Constitution 25 does allow a state to afford
residents and nonresidents disproportionate treatment, in order
for a state to advance a tax policy that discriminates against
nonresidents, the state must show a substantial reason for the
discrimination and a substantial relationship between the
discrimination and the state's objective.26 Since the state failed
18 See id.
19 See id.
20 See Act of May 27, 1999, Ch. 5, § 9(2), [1999] N.Y. Laws 102 (McKinney).
21 See Abby Goodnough, Judge Upholds and Extends Commuter Tax Repeal,
N.Y. TIMES, June 26, 1999, at Al (stating that Judge Cozier's opinion was incorrect
and that the City's corporation counsel would immediately appeal).
22 See Employers Urged to Deduct Tax, N.Y. L.J., July 1, 1999, at 7 (explaining
that since Justice Cozier did not enjoin the state from collecting the tax, it was
under no obligation to refrain from collecting it). While the parties appealed, the
state continued to collect the tax from out-of-state commuters. See City of New York
1, 696 N.Y.S.2d 426, 427 (1st Dep't 1999) (stating that administrative convenience
militated against enjoining the tax's collection while the issue was being adjudicated
by the courts). Indeed, the state was never enjoined from collecting the tax, the
refund process providing an adequate remedy at law. See City of New York II, 730
N.E.2d 920, 924 (N.Y. 2000).
23 See City of New York I, 696 N.Y.S.2d at 427.
24 See City of New York II, 730 N.E.2d at 924.
25 See U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 2 ("The Citizens of each State shall be entitled to
all Privileges and .mmunities of Citizens in the several States.").
26 See City of New York II, 730 N.E.2d at 927 (citing Supreme Court of N.H. v.
Piper, 470 U.S. 274, 284 (1985)) (noting that the discriminating state must show a
substantial reason and substantial relationship between the discrimination and the
state's objective).
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to meet this burden, the court declared that the commuter tax,
as amended, violated the Privileges and Immunities Clause.27
The court next reasoned that, under the Commerce Clause
of the United States Constitution,28 the national interest in
protecting interstate commerce was so strong that in order for a
state to maintain a tax that discriminates against out-of-state
commerce, the state must "advance a local purpose that cannot
be adequately served by reasonable nondiscriminatory
alternatives."29 While a state may advance a compensatory tax
defense for its imposition of a discriminatory tax against
nonresidents, such arguments will receive strict scrutiny.30
Judge Wesley found that the state failed to sustain this defense
and thus held that the commuter tax, as amended, violated the
Commerce Clause.31
27 See City of New York 1, 730 N.E.2d at 929. The state had advanced the
argument that the discriminatory treatment of out-of-state commuters was justified
by the fact that New York State commuters suffered under a greater tax burden
than out-of-state commuters and the repeal amounted to a form of tax relief for
overburdened New York commuters. See Daniel Wise, Judge Strikes Down City's
Commuter Tax, N.Y. L.J., June 28, 1999, at 1 (relating the arguments of New York
State Assistant Attorney General Elizabeth Foreman). Specifically, the state
maintained, even with the repeal in effect, the amount of an out-of-state commuter's
tax would be less than half of what a New York State commuter would pay in
miscellaneous other taxes-from the Metropolitan Commuter Transportation
District tax, to state sales tax, to consumption taxes, as well as others. See City of
New York II, 730 N.E.2d at 928. Judge Wesley rejected these arguments. See id.
(stating that the repeal's legislative history "reveal[ed] no 'tax equalization'
rationale").
28 See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8 ("Congress shall have the power to... regulate
Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several states, and with the Indian
Tribes .... ).
29 City of New York II, 730 N.E.2d at 930 (citing Oregon Waste Sys., Inc. v.
Department of Envtl. Quality, 511 U.S. 93, 101 (1994)).
30 See id. Under Oregon Waste and Maryland v. Louisiana, 451 U.S. 725 (1981),
the state must meet a strict three prong test: (1) identify the intrastate tax it wishes
to compensate for; (2) show that the tax is equivalent to the tax it wishes to impose
on non-residents; and (3) show that the two taxes are based upon similar taxing
events. See Igoe v. Pataki, 696 N.Y.S.2d 355, 363 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County), affd sub
nom. City of New York v. State, 696 N.Y.S.2d 426 (1st Dep't 1999), affd, 730 N.E.2d
920 (N.Y. 2000).
31 See City of New York II, 730 N.E.2d at 926 ("[Tihe tax clearly is assessed
against the interstate labor market per se... and favors intrastate economic
activity over interstate activity by taxing only out-of-State workers."). Unlike the
lower courts, the Court of Appeals did not address any further constitutional claims.
In the trial court, Justice Cozier had reasoned that, under the Equal Protection and
Due Process Clauses of the United States and New York State constitutions, a
statute affording disparate treatment between classes of people need only survive
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Judge Wesley further reasoned that while the New York
State constitution specifically limits the power of the state
legislature to act in relation to local governments, 32 in that a law
relating to the "property, affairs, or government of a local
government" requires a home rule message, 33 the state's
overriding power over taxation rendered a home rule message for
the repeal of the commuter tax unnecessary in this instance.
34
The New York Court of Appeals refused to pass on the wisdom of
the repeal of the commuter tax35 and declared the commuter tax,
as amended, unconstitutional. 36
III. CONSTITUTIONAL HOME RULE IN NEW YORK
While the New York Court of Appeals was certainly correct
in holding that the commuter tax, as amended, was in violation
rational basis scrutiny: that is, it must rationally advance a legitimate purpose. See
Igoe, 696 N.Y.S.2d at 364 (noting that the Equal Protection Clauses of the United
States and New York State constitutions provide essentially the same guarantees).
Finding a tax that discriminated solely on the basis of residency to be arbitrary,
irrational, and illegitimate, Justice Cozier held that the amended commuter tax
violated Equal Protection and Due Process. See id. at 364 n.4. Because he had found
the amended tax legislation to violate the Privileges and Immunities, Commerce,
Equal Protection, and Due Process Clauses, Justice Cozier declined to address the
argument that the tax also violated the right to travel. See id.
32 See City of New York II, 730 N.E.2d at 924-25; see also N.Y. CONST. art. IX,
§ 2.
33 N.Y. CONST. art. IX, § 2(b)(2) ("Subject to the bill of rights of local
governments and other applicable provisions of this constitution, the legislature...
[sihall have the power to act in relation to the property, affairs or government of any
local government only by general law, or by special law .... ).
34 See City of New York II, 730 N.E.2d at 926 (holding that "[a] home rule
message was not required").
35 See id. (explaining that judicial speculation on the political motivation of the
legislature would be a "slippery and dangerous slope"). Justice Cozier, in a portion of
his opinion later withdrawn for publication, was more effusive on the political
motivation of the repeal, stating that,
[tihe Court recognizes that the manner in which Chapter 5 was enacted
into law may not please many of the citizens of New York State. Debate
was limited to less than one hour in the Senate; in the Assembly to
approximately ninety minutes. The Commuter Tax bill passed in a mere
eleven days. No public hearings were held and no legislative studies or
reports were conducted, despite the fact that the City potentially stood to
lose $360 million annually in revenue. However, it is not [the] province of
the Court to endorse or condemn the Legislature's judgment in passing
legislation ....
Igoe v. Pataki, N.Y. L.J., July 1, 1999, at 30 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1999).
36 See City of New York II, 730 N.E.2d at 924.
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of the United States Constitution,37 and while "[sluch authority
as there is"38 arguably supports its conclusion that a home rule
37 Over eighty years ago, the Supreme Court held that a state, under the proper
circumstances, may impose a tax on nonresidents based upon income earned within
the state. See Shaffer v. Carter, 252 U.S. 37, 52 (1920) ("[A] State may impose...
taxes... upon incomes accruing to non-residents from their property or business...
or their occupations carried on therein."). The effect of the tax, however, must be
reasonable and "not more onerous in its effect." Id. If the Court were unable to find
adequate ground for the discrimination of such a tax, it would be stricken as "an
unwarranted denial... of the [non-resident's] privileges and immunities." Travis v.
Yale & Towne Mfg. Co., 252 U.S. 60, 80 (1920); see generally John D. Perovich,
Annotation, Validity of Municipal Ordinance Imposing Income Tax or License Upon
Nonresidents Employed in Taxing Jurisdiction, 48 A.L.R.3d 343 (2000). When the
Privileges and Immunities Clause is implicated, however, an income tax on non-
residents will be held to "a standard of review substantially more rigorous than that
applied to [other] state tax distinctions." Austin v. New Hampshire, 420 U.S. 656,
663 (1975). In Austin, the Supreme Court held that New Hampshire's commuter tax,
which the state had argued was not "onerous in [its] effect... on non-residents" was
nonetheless violative of the Privileges and Immunities Clause. See id. at 666. The
Court specifically rejected an argument similar to the one advanced by New York
State in Igoe, that the tax on nonresidents' incomes affected tax equity between
nonresidents and residents who paid more in other taxes. See id. at 665-66 n.10.
("[We find no support... for the assertion.., that the ... [tiax creates no more
than a 'practical equality' between residents and nonresidents when the taxes paid
only by residents are taken into account.").
More recently, the United States Supreme Court has underscored the need for
greater scrutiny of discriminatory taxes. See Lunding v. New York Tax Appeals
Tribunal, 522 U.S. 287, 298 (1997) (citing Austin, 420 U.S. at 663). The Court
explained that "tax provisions imposing discriminatory treatment on nonresident
individuals must be reasonable in effect and based on a substantial justification
other than the fact of nonresidence." Id. at 314 (emphasis added).
New York State's argument in Igoe, that New York State residents' higher tax
burden provided substantial justification for disparate treatment of out-of-state
commuters, was bound to fail. Assuming that there is a disparate tax burden, and
that the tax on out-of-state commuters only provided equality for that disparate
burden, the tax still failed for being based upon different taxable events. See City of
New York I, 696 N.Y.S.2d 426, 426 (1st Dep't 1999). In fact, the real question
becomes, how did Albany think the repeal of the commuter tax would survive its
first court challenge? Obviously, Albany contemplated just such a result since the
repeal provided for a total repeal of the commuter tax in just such an event. See
supra note 5 (discussing how the legislation provided that if the amendment was
adjudged to be invalid or unconstitutional on its face or in its application, the entire
commuter tax would be repealed) (citing Act of May 27, 1999, §§ 3, 4, 9(2), [1999]
N.Y. Laws at 102-03 (McKinney)). The state tried, cynically, to bolster its argument
by claiming that if the repeal were found unconstitutional, nonresidents would fail
to share in the cost of city services and facilities. See Igoe v. Pataki, N.Y. L.J., July
1, 1999, at 29 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1999) (stating, in a passage not included in the
final version of the opinion, that "[iut was the Legislature and Governor who chose to
repeal the tax in an expedient fashion; the State cannot now complain for the
ensuing loss of revenue due to its own actions").
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message was not required prior to its enactment, it is suggested
that this decision is only one more in a long line of narrow
judicial interpretations exemplifying the near total failure of
constitutional home rule in New York.
Article IX of the New York State constitution provides the
basic system of local governance in New York State.39 In its
present form, adopted in 1963,40 it provides that the state
shall have the power to act in relation to the property, affairs or
government of any local government only by general law, or by
special law only... on request of two-thirds of the total
membership of its legislative body or on request of its chief
executive officer concurred in by a majority of such
membership. 41
The state may freely enact legislation relating to local
property, affairs, or government by a general law which "in its
terms and in effect applies to all counties... all cities, all towns
or all villages."42 If the legislature desires to enact a special law
that "applies to one or more, but not all, counties... cities,
towns or villages,"43 then it must obtain a home rule message. A
home rule message is one requested by two-thirds of the local
legislative body or by the local chief executive officer with a
majority of the local legislative body.4
38 See City of New York I, 696 N.Y.S.2d at 428 ("Such authority as there is on
the subject does not suggest that legislation enabling local taxation cannot be
repealed without a home rule message." (citing N.Y. CONST. art. IX, § 2(b)(1) and
Roosevelt Raceway v. County of Nassau, 218 N.E.2d 539 (N.Y. 1966), appeal
dismissed, 385 U.S. 453 (1967).
39 See PETER J. GALIE, THE NEW YORK CONSTITuTION 210 (1991).
40 See id.
41 N.Y. CONST. art. IX, § 2(b)(2). The Article further provides that, for cities
besides New York City, the state may act in emergencies certified by the Governor
and concurred in by two-thirds of the legislature. See id. § 2(b)(2)(b); see also GALIE,
supra note 39, at 210 (stating that Article IX was "meant to embody a new concept
in state-local relationships by constitutionally recognizing that the 'expansion of
powers for effective local self-government' is a purpose of the people of the state").
42 N.Y. CONST. art. IX, § 3(d)(1).
43 Id. § 3(d)(4).
44 See GALIE, supra note 39, at 217.
The state legislature has the power to act in relation to the property affairs
of government of any local government only by general law as defined in
section 3(d)(1) and by special law as defined in section 3(d)(4) and only
when requested by two-thirds of the members of the local legislative body
or the chief executive officer with the concurrence of a majority of that
body....
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The roots of constitutional home rule in New York extend
deep into the State's history and reflect a persistent and
fundamental problem-inadequate representation of New York
City in the state legislature and consequent loss of power.45
Home rule first became a part of the New York State
constitution in 1894.46 By 1924, when the home rule Article was
amended "with much ado and after many years of agitation,"47
the basic framework of modern home rule and its attendant
problems were already firmly established.4 8 The original ideal of
giving underrepresented cities constitutional protection against
abuse by the state legislature had already been undermined.49
Further, with the parameters of home rule being defined by the
dichotomy of "special" versus "general" laws on the one hand °
45 See W. Bernard Richland, Constitutional City Home Rule in New York, 54
COLUM. L. REV. 311, 317-19 (1954) (stating that while home rule came about as the
result of a long history of legislative abuse, because of "systematically narrow
judicial interpretation," home rule has failed in its purpose). As early as 1821,
Martin Van Buren was reported to have decried the inverse relationship between
the amount of taxes New York City paid to the state coffers and the number of
representatives the City sent to the state legislature. See id. at 317.
46 See N.Y. CONST. art. XII, § 2 (1894). Original efforts to limit the state's power
to enact legislation relating to the property, affairs, or government of cities except by
general laws that applied to all cities were quashed. See Richland, supra note 45, at
320. Instead, cities were divided into three classes by population, with a general law
being a law that applied to all cities within any class. See id. at 321. The first class
was defined as a city of 250,000 or more inhabitants; the second class was defined as
a city of 50,000-250,000 inhabitants; the third class was defined as less than 50,000
inhabitants. See id. at 321 n.34. Further, the state could still act by special law,
which applied to less than all the cities within any class, but only with permission of
that city's mayor. See id. If such permission was not received within fifteen days, the
state legislature could simply pass the bill again with no further permission needed.
See id.
47 In re Elm Street, 158 N.E. 24, 25 (N.Y. 1927).
48 See J.D. Hyman, Home Rule in New York 1941-1965; Retrospect and
Prospect, 15 BuFF. L. REV. 335, 341 (1965) (explaining how the New York Court of
Appeals recognized the problems associated with modern home rule: "Here are the
germs of the fever about what is of the city and what is of the state, a fever which
throve on the simple fact that the city is in the state").
49 See id. (exemplifying how courts did not construe the home rule liberally in
order to effectuate its purpose of reducing legislative involvement in city affairs).
50 The transparency of this distinction, purportedly establishing an inviolate,
albeit limited, sphere of city autonomy, was shown only the next year when the
legislature amended the Rapid Transit Act in order to create transit boards in the
class of "cities of over one million inhabitants." See Sun Printing & Publ'g Ass'n, v.
Mayor, 40 N.Y.S. 607, 638 (1st Dep't 1896) (citing Ch. 4, [1891] N.Y. Laws 3
(McKinney)). This was a general law, applicable to all the cities within a class,
except that the class contained only New York City! See Richland, supra note 45, at
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and the undefined "property, affairs or government"51 on the
other, the concept was soon to be undermined by the courts; a
precipitous fall from which it has never recovered. 52
As has already been seen,53 home rule was seriously
undermined at an early stage by the simple expedient of passing
a law affecting only New York City but calling it a general law.5 4
This practice was given credence by the courts in 1896.55 In a
challenge against a liquor licensing law for which City approval
322 ("It was thus manifest that.., home rule ... could be frustrated by the familiar
device of fictitious classification."); see also New York Steam Corp. v. City of New
York, 276 N.Y.S. 99, 107-08 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1934) (describing the Buckley
Act as a general law, not a local law, referring to cities with a population of a million
inhabitants or more, even though New York City was the only city that fit the
criteria).
51 The meaning of this phrase, ostensibly the starting point for any discussion
relating to the division between state and city government, was so little understood
that in 1907, the phrase was changed temporarily to "property, affairs of
government." See N.Y. CONST. art. XII, § 2 (1894) (amended 1907) (emphasis added).
The reason for this critical change in constitutional language is unknown and
appears to have gone unnoticed. See Richland, supra note 45, at 324 ("Curiously
enough, the change was overlooked not only by the courts but also by all the writers
on home rule.").
52 See Richland, supra note 45, at 311.
[Home rule provisions] came about as the result of a long history of
legislative abuse, and were inserted in the constitution only after the most
strenuous efforts of leaders of the community. Yet because of
systematically narrow judicial interpretation these provisions must be
recognized as having failed in their purpose.
Id.
53 See id.; supra text accompanying note 50.
64 It should be noted that this course of events was by no means unintentional.
The classification of cities, and the distinction between special and general laws was
suggested in 1894 by Joseph H. Choate. Mr. Choate stated that, "in the city of New
York, about which I suppose the principal interest in this amendment centers, I
think we need from time to time rescue by the Legislature." Richland, supra note 45,
at 321 (quoting 2 The Revised Record of the Constitutional Convention of 1894 245
(1900)).
55 See People ex reL Einsfeld v. Murray, 44 N.E. 146 (N.Y. 1896). The court
upheld the constitutionality of an act that taxed the trafficking of liquors, and in
effect, burdened New York City residents most heavily. The court rejected the view
that this act was not uniform throughout the state and therefore encroached on the
powers of local government. Instead, the court reasoned that because revenue from
the tax did not go into the state treasury, and in fact two-thirds of the revenue went
to the local governments, the act was a "general state excise law, with such special
provisions and adaptations to localities as to the legislature seemed proper." Id. at
150. Furthermore, the court held that because it was done to limit the "dangerous
traffic, in the interests of social order and public welfare" the act was within the
State's powers and should not be subject to home rule. Id. at 148-49.
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had not been obtained,5 6 the New York Court of Appeals declared
that, indeed, the State could act solely in relation to New York
City without implicating home rule. 57
The cynical practice of enacting purely local laws under the
name of "general law"58 was finally addressed and rejected by the
Court of Appeals in 1927.59 Chief Judge Cardozo, fearing that
home rule would become "another Statute of Uses, a form of
words and little else,"60 decried the practice of enacting a law
general "in its terms" but local "in its effect."61 In striking such a
law for failure to comply with home rule requirements, 62 the
court boldly declared that "[t]he municipality is to be protected
in its autonomy against the inroads of evasion."63
56 See Hyman, supra note 48, at 340. In describing the grounds upon which the
constitutionality of the act was assailed, Chief Justice Andrews stated "that the act
is a special city law . . . required to be submitted to the mayor, for acceptance or
rejection, before final enactment." Einsfeld, 44 N.E. at 146.
57 See Einsfeld, 44 N.E. at 150 ("[Ihe legislature is not hampered or restrained
by the classification of cities in the constitution. It may adjust details to meet
varying conditions.... [Riegulations which might be suitable... for the city of New
York... might be unnecessary... if applied to... Buffalo."). It should be noted that
this statement was pure dicta, as the law in question was clearly a general law. See
Richland, supra note 45, at 321-22.
58 See 1921 INF. OP. ATT'1 GEN. 263-64 (quoting Sun Printing & Publ'g Ass'n v.
Mayor of New York, 46 N.E. 499 (N.Y. 1897).
"[Clities of over one million inhabitants" was advisedly used by the
Legislature in order to obviate the necessity of submitting such provisions
of the law to the mayor.... The substitution of the words "the city of New
York" would undoubtedly make such sections local and not general and the
bill would of necessity be submitted to the mayor for approval or
disapproval.
Id.
59 See In re Elm Street, 158 N.E. 24, 26 (N.Y. 1927). In this case, American
Express was barred from collecting a twenty-three year old receivable from the City
of New York pursuant to the Civil Practice Act, which stated that there was a
presumption of payment after twenty-two years. Four years later, the state passed a
law, tailored so that it applied only to American Express' barred claim.
We close our eyes to realities if we do not see in this act the marks of
legislation that is special and local in terms and in effect. This group of
conditions so unusual and particular is precisely fitted to the claimant's
case, and only by a most singular coincidence could be fitted to any other.
Id. at 26.
60 Id. at 25.
61 Id.
62 See id. at 26 ("By its terms a new burden has been laid, not upon cities
generally, despite its pretense of generality, but upon one city or a few.").
63 Id.
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While the ramparts of constitutional home rule were being
fortified against encroachment by sham general laws, 64 the
ultimate defeat of home rule was already within the gates. In
1929, the Court of Appeals upheld the Multiple Dwelling Law65
despite its failure to conform to home rule requirements. 66
Declaring the words "property, affairs or government" to be
"words of art,"67 and the subject of the legislation to be a "matter
of state concern,"68 the court forever undermined city autonomy
in favor of state power.69
In a concurring opinion, Chief Judge Cardozo declared that
even if a law affects the property, affairs, or government of a
city, "if the subject be in a substantial degree a matter of state
concern, the Legislature may act, though intermingled with it
are concerns of the locality."70 This test is more than a simple
means of classifying general and local laws; it is an express
limitation on the power of local governments to act in the face of
legislative power.71 Thus, under the "state concern" doctrine,
even if legislation relates to the property, affairs, or government
of a city, if the legislation is also a matter of state concern, home
64 See id.
65 See ch. 713, § 3, [1929] N.Y. Laws 1663 (McKinney). The law was posted to
deal with slum dwellings. It was applicable only to cities with 800,000 residents or
more. New York City was the only city that met the requirements. See Adler v.
Deegan, 167 N.E. 705, 709 (N.Y. 1929).
66 See Adler,167 N.E. at 709; Richland, supra, note 45, at 329.
67 See Adler, 167 N.E. at 707 ("When the people put these words in... the
Constitution, they put them there with a Court of Appeals' definition, not that of
Webster's Dictionary."). This assertion was based upon faulty premises. See
Richland, supra note 45, at 330. The prior home rule cases were based on the
deliberate misclassification of local laws as being general. See supra notes 50, 53-63
and accompanying text. Further, during the period 1907-1924, the phrase was not
"property, affairs or government" but "property, affairs of government." See supra
note 51 (emphasis added).
68 See Adler, 167 N.E. at 708 ("[Alnything that affects the health and the
welfare of the city of New York, touches almost directly the welfare of the state as a
whole.").
69 See James D. Cole, Constitutional Home Rule in New York: "The Ghost of
Home Rule," 59 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 713, 715 (1985) ("The balance between state and
local powers has tipped away from the preservation of local authority toward a
presumption of state concern.").
70 Adler, 167 N.E. at 714 (Cardozo, C.J., concurring).
71 See id. ("[Ihf the affair is partly state and partly local, the city is free to act
until the state has intervened.... The power of the city is subordinate at such times
to the power of the state .... ).
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rule is not implicated and the legislature may act through
ordinary legislative process.72
The courts have repeatedly found legislation relating to the
property, affairs, or government of cities, yet which also related
to a state concern, valid despite the failure of those laws to
conform to home rule requirements.73 Reviewing the "degree of
autonomy granted to municipalities under the...
constitutional... home rule provisions,"74 and mindful of the
"possible danger of ill considered interference by the Legislature
in... local affairs,"75 the Court of Appeals has found that home
rule "applies only to a special law which is directly concerned
with the property, affairs or government of a local government
and unrelated to a matter of proper concern to State
72 See Cole, supra note 69, at 718. It should be noted that the law at issue in
Adler was a good law, "aimed at many evils, but most of all.., to eradicate the
slum." Adler, 167 N.E. at 711 (Cardozo, C.J., concurring). In achieving a just result,
however, the court completely undermined the ideals of home rule. See Richland,
supra note 45, at 332 ("[T]hrough the invention of the doctrine of state concern
[cities] had lost what immunity they had enjoyed from legislative interference.").
Cardozo's fear that the city could undermine the powers of the state to act in
relation to matters of statewide concerns, especially health and safety, could have
been prevented while preserving the rubric of home rule. "[The state] still possesses
the constitutional power [to act in relation to health and safety], which has never
been abdicated, to pass this identical statute by a two-thirds vote on an emergency
message." Adler, 167 N.E. at 719 (O'Brian, J., dissenting); see also Oelbermann
Assoc. Ltd. Partnership v. Borov, 535 N.Y.S.2d 315, 321 (Civ. Ct. N.Y. County 1988)
(holding that the Loft Law, N.Y. MULT. DWELL. LAW §§ 280-87 (McKinney Supp.
2000), a state statute exempting loft apartments from zoning requirements, was
valid and home rule was therefore not applicable); Kelley v. McGee, 443 N.E.2d 908,
915 (N.Y. 1982) (holding a state statute that imposed minimum salary requirements
for district attorneys, depending on the size of the county, constitutional and not in
violation of home rule). But see City of New York v. Patrolmen's Benevolent Ass'n,
642 N.Y.S.2d 1003 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1996) (holding a state statute
unconstitutional and in violation of home rule where the Public Employment
Relations Board was permitted to intervene in bargaining negotiations between the
City and police officers).
73 See supra note 72.
74 Baldwin v. City of Buffalo, 160 N.E.2d 443, 445 (N.Y. 1959) (holding that the
altering of ward boundaries was a matter of state concern because members of the
County Board of Supervisors are elected from these wards).
75 City of New York v. State, 562 N.E.2d 118, 120 (N.Y. 1990). The court held
that a law requiring residents of Staten Island to be asked if they wanted Staten
Island to be a separate city was not an act in relation to the property, affairs, or
government of New York City because the law was not authorizing secession; it was
merely recognizing the interest of its residents, which is a state concern. See id.
(citing City of New York v. Village of Lawrence, 165 N.E. 836, 839 (N.Y. 1929)).
2000] RECENT DEVELOPMENT IN NEW YORK LAW 949
government." 76 Under the doctrine of state concern, the state
was free to act, without implicating home rule, when it issued
serial bonds to cover liabilities;77 executed projects in disregard
of local zoning laws;78 enacted zoning laws for Adirondack
Park;79 enacted legislation directed solely at the Museum of
Modern Art;80 forbade New York City from instituting residency
requirements for its firefighters;8 1 and mandated the pay of
county district attorneys.8 2
76 Town of Islip v. Cuomo, 473 N.E.2d 756, 757 (N.Y. 1984) (holding that the
state can regulate waste disposal in Nassau and Suffolk Counties because it has a
state interest in pollution protection).
77 See Bugeja v. City of New York, 215 N.E.2d 684 (N.Y. 1966). The court held
an act that gave the Mayor of the City of New York the authority to issue serial
bonds in the maximum amount of $225,800,000 for payment of pension or
retirement liabilities to be constitutional. See id. (affirming the constitutionality of
the act "with respect to its object and its means").
78 See Floyd v. New York State Urban Dev. Corp., 300 N.E.2d 704 (N.Y. 1973).
The court ruled that a statute under which the New York State Urban Development
Corporation (UDC) was authorized to plan and execute projects in disregard of local
zoning laws was constitutional. The court reasoned that the state did not provide
actual building codes on behalf of the state and therefore did not overstep any
guidelines. Furthermore, the court held the state has a legitimate interest in
allowing the UDC to solve housing problems. It was explained that the UDC was
"given the power to 'override' local zoning ordinances and regulations in order to
overcome restrictive local standards that have often impeded urgently needed
development or have rendered it prohibitively expensive." Id. at 706 (quoting [1992]
N.Y. LEGIS. ANN. 448). Therefore, the court held that "local laws otherwise in
conflict may not inhibit the operation of general laws." F/oyd, 300 N.E.2d at 706.
79 See Wambat Realty Corp. v. State of New York, 362 N.E.2d 581 (N.Y. 1977)
(upholding the constitutionality of the Adirondack Park Agency Act, in which the
state set up a zoning and planning program for all public and private lands within
the park despite the zoning and planning powers of local government, because the
court concluded it was an issue of legitimate state concern).
80 See Hotel Dorset Co. v. Trust for Cultural Resources of City of New York, 385
N.E.2d 1284 (N.Y. 1978). The court upheld as constitutional, an act that permitted
the Museum of Modern Art to realize income though tax equivalent payments made
from the sale and rental of condominiums to be built above the Museum. See id. at
1288 (reasoning the act was not tailored to meet the sole needs of the Museum of
Modern Art and that other institutions would also be eligible).
81 See Uniformed Firefighters Ass'n v. City of New York, 405 N.E.2d 679 (N.Y.
1980). In rejecting the validity of a New York City law that created a residency
requirement for municipal officers and employees, the court reasoned that although
the "structure and control" of municipalities are within the power of local
government, residency of employees is a matter of state concern. Id. at 680.
82 See Kelley v. McGee, 443 N.E.2d 908 (N.Y. 1982) (deciding that the section of
the Judiciary Law which required district attorneys in counties with a certain
population to be paid the same salary as county court judges did not conflict with
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In one exception to this trend, and the case upon which New
York City Mayor Giuliani had pinned his hopes in Igoe,8 3 the
New York Court of Appeals rejected state legislation relating to
collective bargaining procedures for public employees because
the legislature failed to obtain a home rule message from New
York City.84 Critical of the ease with which a matter of state
concern could overcome local concerns,8 5 the court declared that
"a more substantive nexus should be required if home rule is to
remain a vital principle of fundamental law."8 6 Emphasizing
that the state concern must be substantial,8 7 the court found that
the interest advanced by the state bore no relationship to the
enactment of the legislation.88 Despite a holding that seems to
be in favor of home rule, the decision must be viewed narrowly.
There was clear precedent for the proposition that fire
departments were a matter of local concern 9 and the court's
conclusion that there was no substantial state concern,90 while in
conflict with the greater trend in home rule jurisprudence, 91 at a
minimum, had a rational basis.92
Clearly then, "[sluch authority as there is on the subject
does not suggest that legislation enabling local taxation cannot
home rule provisions of state constitution because the classification was reasonable
and was related to an area of proper state concern).
83 See supra notes 12-15 and accompanying text.
84 See City of New York v. Patrolmen's Benevolent Ass'n, 676 N.E.2d 847 (N.Y.
1996).
85 See id. at 851 (stating that "[sitate local legislation will almost invariably
result in upholding the statute over home rule objections if,... the law merely bears
some relationship to some conceivable State interest").
86 Id.
87 See supra notes 70-72 and accompanying text (discussing Chief Judge
Cardozo's test).
88 See Patrolmen's Benevolent Ass'n, 676 N.E.2d at 852 ("[Ilt would be
absolutely inconsistent with the sensitive balancing of State and local interests that
has been our tradition... to justify legislation inimical to ... home rule... based
purely on considerations having no apparent role in its enactment....").
89 See City of New York v. Patrolmen's Benevolent Ass'n, 642 N.Y.S.2d 1003,
1011 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County), aff/d, 647 N.Y.S.2d 728 (1st Dep't), affd, 676 N.E.2d
847 (N.Y. 1996) ("Historically... fire departments... have been deemed matters of
local concern") (quoting Osborn v. Cohen, 4 N.E.2d 289, 290 (N.Y. 1936)).
90 See Patrolmen's Benevolent Ass'n, 676 N.E.2d at 851-53.
91 See supra notes 73-82.
92 See Pdrez-Pefia, supra note 5, at B10 (quoting legal experts as stating that
"city contract negotiations with its police officers and firefighters are solely a city
concern").
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be repealed without a home rule message." 3 For while New
York City relied upon the commuter tax for over thirty years to
meet its unique fiscal burden,94 when it comes to defining what
is a local concern, "[mlost important of all, perhaps is the control
of the locality over payments from the local purse."95 The State
can justify the repeal of the commuter tax under the policy of a
pattern of cutting taxes.9 6 It is tempting to suggest that a simple
solution to this problem would be to eliminate, either
legislatively or judicially, the state concern doctrine which has so
undermined the ideals of home rule,97 but this solution is
illusory. While "[a] municipality without the power of taxation
would be a body without life, incapable of acting, and serving no
useful purpose,"98 under the New York State constitution, the
legislature's "power of taxation shall never be surrendered,
suspended or contracted away."99 Any legislation enabling a
local government to impose taxes "shall specify the types of taxes
which may be imposed.., and provide for their review."1 00 Even
the main revenue source for most local governments, the
property tax, is severely restricted by the legislature. 1 1 While
93 City of New York I, supra note 15, 696 N.Y.S.2d 426, 428 (1st Dep't 1999).
9 See Fuchs, supra note 4, at A13. New York, alone among major cities, pays
50% of the state's share of welfare and Medicaid for city residents. See id. Chicago
has its courts, corrections, and hospitals financed and administered by Cook County;
its welfare financed by Illinois; and its mass transit financed by a regional
transportation authority. See id. In contrast, New York City spends approximately
70% of its budget on these services. See id.
95 Adler v. Deegan, 167 N.E. 705, 713 (N.Y. 1929) (Cardozo, C.J., concurring).
96 See George E. Pataki, Two Views of the Commuter's Curse: Isn't it Obvious?
Cutting Taxes Helps the Economy, N.Y. TIMES, May 22, 1999, at A13 (stating that
eliminating the commuter tax is part of the Governor's broad pattern of tax cuts
meant to encourage economic growth.). In fact, though, New York City residents pay
more to the state in revenue that they receive from the state in expenditures. See
City of New York II, 730 N.E.2d 920, 928 (N.Y. 2000) (observing that "New York City
is not a net drain on the financial strength of the rest of the State and, contrary to
the State's argument, resident commuters are not supporting New York City").
97 It is common for commentators on home rule generally-even those not
dealing directly with New York-to point to New York as an example of a home rule
system that has failed its purpose. See, e.g., Rubin G. Cohn, Municipal Revenue
Powers in the Context of Constitutional Home Rule, 51 Nw. U. L. REV. 27, 33-34
(1957) (maintaining that "Constitutional home rule in New York, far from liberating
cities from the domination of the legislature... reaffirms the doctrine of state
supremacy.... Municipal autonomy... is wholly non-existent").
98 United States v. New Orleans, 98 U.S. 381, 393 (1878).
99 N.Y. CONST. art. XVI, § 1.
100 Id.
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some have suggested that a solution to this problem might lie in
establishing a multipurpose taxing jurisdiction including
Westchester and Nassau counties,10 2 what is really needed is a
comprehensive system of fiscal home rule. California, Ohio, and
Illinois allow localities to initiate tax and finance programs,
limited by legislative oversight. 03 Ideally, such a system would
provide local governments with the power to tax, with
mandatory state assistance to poorer communities to provide a
minimum level of local services, and a limit on the state's power
to enact unfunded mandates. 0 4
In any event, if constitutional home rule in New York State
is to remain true to the ideals that prompted its enactment over
a century ago, then, in the words of New York State Governor
Russell P. Flower in 1892: "[The legislature should be content
with supplying the framework of municipal government, wisely
guarded against possible abuses, and within that framework the
properly constituted local authorities should have sole charge of
local administration . . . . The State's interference may
occasionally be wholesome, but it is more likely to be
pernicious." 10 5 Otherwise, home rule will have been relegated
from being a viable political concept to only "a form of words and
little else."106
101 See N.Y. CONST. art. VIII, §§ 1-11 (establishing extensive tax and debt
limits on local governments); N.Y. CONST. art. VIII, § 12 ("Nothing in this article
shall be construed to prevent the legislature from further restricting the powers...
[of local governments] .. . to contract indebtedness or to levy taxes on real estate.").
102 See Fuchs, supra note 4, at A13 (citing Chicago as an example of how
neighboring suburban counties and the state can relieve the burdens inherent in
providing services for a large city.).
103 See Joni Armstrong Coffey, The Case for Fiscal Home Rule, 71 FLA. B. J. 54,
58 (1997); Note, Democracy or Distrust? Restoring Home Rule for the District of
Columbia in the Post-Control Board Era, 111 HARV. L. REV. 2045, 2060-61 (1998)
(recommending a clear delegation between national interests, reserved for Congress,
and local interests which should be delegated to the District).
104 See Richard Briffault, Local Government and the New York State
Constitution, 1 HOFSTRA L. & POLY SYMP. 79, 101-06 (1996) (stating that such a
system could be accomplished either by giving localities the constitutional power to
enact specific taxes or by expanding home rule to include general authority over
taxation); George D. Vaubel, Toward Principles of State Restraint Upon the Exercise
of Municipal Power in Home Rule, 24 STETSON L. REV. 417, 419 (1995) (discussing
the conflict inherent in protecting the local power of the municipality while
simultaneously insuring the effectiveness of state government).
105 9 N.Y. Gov. Ann. Mess. 28-30 (1909).
106 In re Elm Street, 158 N.E. 24, 25 (1927).
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